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Introduction
After a hiatus of nearly a decade, the flow of
international capital to Latin America resumed at the
beginning of the current decade.  Having adjusted to
scarcity, Latin America soon found itself faced with
the relatively unfamiliar challenge of managing an
abundance of international capital.
Though often characterized as a problem, the
renewed flow of capital was also widely and no doubt
correctly perceived as an international vote of
confidence in the liberalization and stabilization
measures undertaken by most Latin American
economies in preceding years, and a valuable
opportunity to deploy international savings to
promote development of the domestic economy.  The
most serious concerns about the capital flows
stemmed not from the inflows themselves, but from
the possibility that they might, for reasons internal or
external to the recipient countries, abruptly slow or
even reverse themselves, thus forcing a potentially
abrupt and  painful  macroeconomic and financial
adjustment.
These concerns were proven legitimate during the
course of 1994 when, after a series of domestic
political shocks in Mexico and a substantial tightening
of United States monetary policy, the rate of capital
flow to Mexico slowed sharply and toward the end of
the year reversed itself.  By the beginning of 1995 the
reduction in capital inflows became more generalized,
contributing to financial instability in much of the
region, and major financial crises in Mexico and
Argentina, crises that have persisted the recovery of
capital flows that  has taken place in mid-1995.
This paper reviews recent experience with
international capital flows in Latin America, and
discusses the policy issues that surround them.  The
paper is predicated on three basic premises:
¦ capital flows to the region are an important
source of macroeconomic disturbance;
¦ capital flows are very volatile, and the
large fluctuations in these flows are due in
substantial part to factors external to Latin
America; and,
¦ the fluctuations require a policy response.
Policy should respond to sudden inflows or
outflows of capital.  And it can also create
institutions and policy regimes to reduce  the
economy's vulnerability to volatile international
capital.
1.  Capital flows are important
As illustrated  in the following chart, there is a strong
empirical correlation between economic growth in
Latin America and flows of capital to the region.
During the inflows episode of 1976-1982 (henceforth
referred to as "the 1970s"), Latin America grew
nearly 4 percent per year, while receiving net capital
flows of nearly 5 percent of GDP.  During the period
of capital scarcity that began in mid-1982 and ended
around 1990, growth fell to less than 1.5 percent per
year, while net capital flows to the region declined to
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in Latin America
And in 1991-1994, growth of about 3.5 percent per
year was accompanied by capital inflows amounting
to roughly 6 percent per year.
This relationship is of course in part  noncausal, as
both growth and capital inflows depend largely upon
similar aspects of the policy and nonpolicy economic
environment, and the causality that does exist clearly
runs in more than one direction, as international
investors tend to search for regions in which rapid
growth can be expected.  But the chart nevertheless
illustrates what theory and Latin American experience
would lead one to expect: capital inflows can provide
a strongly expansionary impulse to the domesticPage 3
economy, and sharp reductions in the rate of inflow
can be strongly contractionary, at least in the short
run.
2.  Capital flows are volatile and in large part
exogenous to the region.
The following chart shows the recent behavior of net
capital flows to Latin America since 1970, and
compares it with movements in world real interest
rates.  Two lessons emerge from this comparison.
First, the flow of capital to Latin America is very
volatile.  From a peak of about 6 percent of GDP in
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roughly nil in 1983, and stayed close to that level
until around 1990, when they increased almost as
abruptly to about 4 percent of Latin America's GDP
in 1991 and 6 percent of GDP in 1993 and 1994.
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Second, the flow of capital to Latin America is very
largely determined by developments in the world
economy that are essentially exogenous to Latin
America.  The above chart shows that net flows to
the region are highly correlated with the world
interest rate, over which economic developments in
Latin America have little influence.  The turning point
of each major phase of the capital-flows cycles
experienced since the 1970's can be correlated with a
substantial movement in world interest rates.
2
A comparison of capital flows to Latin America and
the current account surplus of the major
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External factors
fluctuations in the availability of international capital
and realized capital flows to the region.  The chart
shows that capital flows to Latin America were low
in the 1980's, when the large industrial countries were
running substantial current-account deficits, and the
surge of inflows to Latin America during the 1990s
was associated with a sharp reduction in the G7
current-account deficit.  The most plausible
interpretation of this chart is that shifts in the
industrial countries' saving-investment balance are
reflected in fluctuations in realized capital flows to
Latin America (and, of course, elsewhere).
This does not mean that capital flows are unaffected
by the domestic policy environment.  In Latin
America during the 1990s, countries that liberalized
aggressively, reduced inflation, and maintained or
created an open trading and financial system received
larger capital flows than those that did not.  It does
mean that, almost whatever the domestic policy
environment, international capital flows are likely to
remain an important mechanism through which to the
industrialized economies are transmitted to Latin
America, and that those shocks will necessarily
require important macroeconomic adjustments, for
which the region needs to prepare.
3.  Capital flows are a policy issue
A sudden shift in the availability of external finance
will require important macroeconomic adjustments.
A reduction in capital flows will typically generate an
increase in domestic interest rates and a decline in
asset values.  This will help secure the reduction inPage 4
domestic expenditure that is required for consistency
with the new, lower supply of foreign finance, but it
will also have adverse implications for domestic
investment, and may generate a sharp contractionary
impulse to the economy.  The reduction in capital
flows will also require a depreciation of the real
exchange rate, with implications for employment and
production in the  tradeables and the  nontradeables
sectors, and creating the need for costly reallocations.
Through its effect on the exchange rate and the
balance of payments, the shock to capital flows will
affect domestic prices and monetary aggregates, with
potentially adverse implications for inflation.
Many of these adjustments are normal and desirable
aspects of adjustment to the changed external
environment.  Policy makers cannot, however, afford
to assume that adjustment will be trouble-free.  In the
world, adjustment to sharp fluctuations in capital
flows is a policy issue because:
P International financial markets are incomplete,
and do not provide insurance against possible risks
associated with the fluctuations in the magnitude
of the flows.
P International financial markets may be subject to
"fads", "bubbles", or "contagion" effects, in which
international investors make sudden revisions
about prospects for an economy that are
unwarranted by underlying fundamentals. Because
many of these "fundamentals" depend upon the
degree of an economy's access to international
capital markets, there is the possibility of multiple
equilibria - sudden shifts in market sentiment can
be self-fulfilling.
P Labor and product markets may be subject to
externalities that distort the process of adjustment
to changes in capital flows, making the private
response suboptimal.
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P Domestic financial markets may be subject
information or policy-generated imperfections that
cause it to intermediate capital inflows
suboptimally, thus increasing the economy's
vulnerability to subsequent reductions in the rate
of inflow.
P Sharp fluctuations in international capital flows
may interfere with the effectiveness of other
government policies, including attainment of price
stability and management of aggregate demand.
These considerations raise two related types of policy
problem.  The first is the formulation of appropriate
policy responses to increases and decreases in the
flow of international capital as they materialize: for
example, should fiscal policy expand or contract
when international capital becomes more scarce?  The
second is the design of appropriate institutions and
policy regimes to reduce the economy's vulnerability
to fluctuations in international capital flows, and to
minimize adverse effects of their volatility on the real
economy.  Here we might ask: what exchange-rate
regime provides a better adjustment to sharp changes
in the availability of foreign capital?  Can the
regulatory environment within which domestic and
international investors operate affect the magnitude
of such shocks, and their impact on the economy?
The remainder of the paper takes up these and related
issues in more detail.  Section II lays out the points of
macroeconomic contact between international capital
flows and the  macroeconomy, with the aim of
highlighting those aspects of the transmission
mechanism that create policy problems, and outlining
ways in which policy can alleviate the problems.  We
also examine the recent historical experience of Latin
America with capital inflows, focusing on the most
recent inflows episode and the lessons that emerge
from the response to the reduction of those flows
toward the end of 1994.  Section III brings lessons
from these discussions to bear on a discussion of
specific policy questions surrounding the flows.
II.  Capital flows and the macroeconomy
In this section we outline the ways in which capital
flows and policy interact to determine
macroeconomic outcomes, in order to highlight
policy issues that are discussed in the subsequent
section.  The discussion is organized around a simple
schematic approach that is summarized in chart 1,
below.
We begin with a discussion of sources of shocks to
the availability of international capital.  We thenPage 5
discuss how such shocks and policy toward capital
inflows interact to determine the magnitude and
composition of the flows.   Next we discuss how the
realized capital inflows interact with monetary,
exchange-rate and fiscal policy to determine
macroeconomic outcomes such as: whether the
capital inflows finance reserve accumulation or
current- account deficits; whether the current-
account deficits that do emerge are generated by
increased investment or lower savings; and other
macroeconomic consequences of the flows, including
effects on money and prices, on interest rates and
asset prices, and on growth and real activity.
This diagram does not, of course, fully capture all the
relevant macroeconomic interrelations, and variables
in the upper part of the diagram are not in general
exogenous to those listed in the lower part; for
example, exchange rate intervention and sterilization
policy may well affect the magnitude of the change in
capital flows to which the economy is subject.  But
the framework does help to clarify certain important
channels of influence, and in any event provides a
guide for the discussion that follows.
1.  Shocks:
Observed fluctuations in the rate of capital inflow or
outflow may be due to either internal or external
factors.   Domestically-generated shocks may come
from dislocations to the real economy, such as a
transitory productivity shock or a sudden shift in
macroeconomic policy that generates an abrupt
change in the balance between domestic savings and
investment.  Domestically-generated shocks may also
come from financial markets, such as when news
about political outcomes alters domestic and foreign
investors' confidence in the economy and induces
capital inflows or capital flight.
External factors can affect an economy directly, such
as when interest rates in the world economy change,
thereby increasing or reducing the relative
attractiveness of domestic assets.  They may also be
the result of contagion, or bandwagon effects, such as
when adverse news about one country's
creditworthiness alters international  investors'
perceptions of others'.
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In the 1990s, external shocks have been an important
determinant of capital flows to Latin America, and
other emerging-market economies.  Arguably the
most important of these factors has been changing
cyclical conditions in the major industrial countries,
which largely determine world interest rates and
economic activity.  The correlation of capital flows to
Latin America with world interest rates and with the
savings-investment balance of the major industrial
countries has already been noted.  Low world interest
rates affected the attractiveness of investment in Latin
America both directly, and by raising the
creditworthiness of those many emerging-market
economies that are net debtors.
Fluctuations in international capital flows may also
arise from changes in the portfolio preferences of
international investors, which may in turn be caused
by changes in the regulatory environment in which
these investors operate, or in information
technologies.  Shocks to foreign investment may also
result from actual or anticipated changes in regional
trade arrangements; for example, the North American
Free Trade Area may have created a substantial
incentive to invest in Mexico to produce for the
North American market.
Whatever their cause, shocks to the availability of
international capital can be very big, relative to the
economies of Latin America.  The following chart
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It reveals important similarities to and differences
from the capital inflows episode of the 1970s.  First,Page 6
the magnitude of the capital inflows in 1993 and 1994
were even larger than they had been at their peak in
the early 1980s.  The recent surge in the flow of
capital was also substantially more abrupt than in the
previous episode, though it appears to have lasted for
a shorter period of time.
Also visible in the above chart is the fact that, in the
years leading up to the 1982 onset of the debt crisis,
net capital flows to countries other than Mexico had
been declining for some years; this highlights the fact
that the debt crisis of the 1980's was for many
countries a crisis generated as much by domestic
capital flight as by inappropriately high levels of net
borrowing - a fact that distinguishes the most recent
episode from the earlier one.
The above chart also illustrates that the  inflows
episode of the 1990s is to a very large extent a story
about Mexico, and to a lesser extent Argentina (not
shown in the chart.)  Mexico's experience with
international capital markets in the 1982-1989 period
of capital scarcity was harsher than typical; in many
of those years Mexico experienced net capital
outflows, unlike the rest of the region.
But after that experience, renewed inflows began
earlier in Mexico than in most of the region,
presumably because Mexico resolved its debt
problems, stabilized inflation, privatized aggressively
and liberalized its economy relatively early.  The
recovery of international investment in Mexico was
dramatic, and in the early years of the  inflows
episode, flows to Mexico accounted for well over
half of the capital flows to the region, greatly in





















Capital inflows to Latin America
Major recipients
For the 1991-1994 period as a whole Mexico
accounts for nearly 45 percent of the inflows, despite
the sharp decline in flows to Mexico during 1994.
Argentina accounts for another 18 percent of the
inflows, somewhat larger than her size in the regional
economy.  Taken together, Mexico and Argentina
account for over 60 percent of the net flows to the
region, while Chile and Brazil - heavy borrowers
during the 1970s - figure much less prominently
during the 1990s.
Measured relative to the size of the recipient county's
economy, a somewhat different picture emerges.
Relative to GDP, Peru emerges as the largest
recipient of capital flows, with inflows amounting to
roughly 13 percent of GDP during the 1991-1994
period.  Mexico still ranks very high, with inflows of
nearly 8 percent of GDP, but inflows to Argentina are
seen to average only about 4.5 percent of GDP, not
much more than the average for the continent.
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Of the larger countries, Brazil, Colombia, and
Venezuela have experienced capital inflows much
smaller, in comparison with their size, than other
major countries in the region.  In Brazil and
Venezuela, it seems that macroeconomic turbulence -
stabilized in Brazil during 1994 and still ongoing in
Venezuela - made international investors wary.
Colombia, on the other hand, has made substantial
efforts to insulate its economy from volatilePage 7
international capital

























Capital Flows as Percent of GDP
1991-1994
flows, and the relatively low rate of flow into the
country during 1991-1994 may be seen as evidence
that the authorities were at least partially successful in
doing so.
This comparison illustrates the important point that
policy and external shocks are not independent, but
rather interact in the determination of capital inflows.
In Latin America during the 1990s, nearly all
countries participated in the capital inflows associated
with low world interest rates, but countries that were
on good  terms with their international creditors, that
had stabilized inflation and brought fiscal deficits
under control, and that maintained open trade and
financial regimes tended to receive more international
capital than countries that had not.  The relatively
low rate of capital flow to Chile and Colombia
despite generally good macroeconomic fundamentals
is limited evidence that  attempts to moderate the rate
of capital inflow may have some success, at least in
the short run.
2.  Composition of capital flows
The financial instruments used to effect the transfer
of capital will have a substantial impact on the sharing
of risk between residents of the recipient country and
international investors, and may also have a
significant impact on the volatility of international
capital flows to which the economy is subject.
Volatility is likely to be much higher if flows are of a
short-term, purely speculative nature than it might be
if they primarily reflect foreign direct investments that
are presumably guided by medium or long-term
fundamentals.  This is particularly true of short-term
debt instruments, the principal of which becomes
payable frequently.  Equity investment is liquid, and
can be sold by international investors upon short
notice, but owners of equity bear much of the price
risk associated with  a generalized flight of capital
from the economy.  The composition of the flows
also determines their degree of sensitivity to interest-
rate differentials.
The mechanisms through with capital was channeled
to Latin America differed dramatically in recent years





























Capital Flows to Latin America
By type of investment
Source: World Bank
and IMF
As the above chart illustrates, commercial bank
lending was the dominant form of international
intermediation during the 1977-1981 period,
accounting for roughly two-thirds of total flows to
Latin America.
In sharp contrast, commercial bank lending fell to
barely more than 10 percent of the total in the 1991-
1993 period, while foreign direct and equity
investment rose to nearly 40 percent, and
international bond issues increased to over 20 percent
of the total.
These changes have important implications for the
management of capital-account shocks.  The much
higher share of equity investment means that foreign
investors are exposed more directly to and share
more completely in country risk than would be the
case if commercial-bank lending were still the
dominant form of  intermediation.
6   It has beenPage 8
estimated that roughly 20% of the Mexican stock
market's capitalization was foreign-owned at the
beginning of 1994: thus, of the more than $140
billion reduction in the dollar value of the stock
market that occurred between January 1994 and early
March 1995, foreigner investors must have absorbed
something approaching $30 billion.
At the same time, management of international
liquidity or solvency problems may have become
more difficult than it was in the 1980s, as there is at
present no obvious counterpart to the bankers'
committees that were formed in that period to
negotiate with countries over the terms of debt
rescheduling.
Policy can affect the composition of capital inflows in
several ways.  First, sustainable and credible
economic policies are likely to result in less volatile
capital flows, as international investors will be more
willing to make relatively irreversible commitments to
the economy.  Second, tax and regulatory policies
can be designed to reduce the attractiveness of short-
term, speculative inflows, relative to those
investments that imply a larger degree of commitment
to the recipient economy.
7  In several countries, for
example, there are taxes and restrictions on short-
term foreign borrowing.  And finally, various
microeconomic policy measures can affect the
attractiveness of the climate for foreign direct
investment.
3.  Balance of payments adjustment
Net capital inflows must by definition be matched by
central bank reserve accumulation and/or increased
current-account deficits, while  outflows must
necessarily be accompanied by a loss of reserves
and/or movement of the current account toward
surplus.  Domestic macroeconomic  policy play an
important role in determining the pattern of balance
of payments adjustment to sudden shocks to the
capital account.  The exchange rate regime is, of
course, fundamental here.
Under fixed exchange rates the exchange-market
intervention required to defend the parity in the
aftermath of a positive shock to the capital account
will lead to reserve accumulation in the early stages
of an inflows episode, while current-account deficits
are likely to grow as the episode progresses.  In the
polar opposite case of a pure float, in which there is
by definition no central bank intervention, any shock
to the capital account must have as its counterpart an
equal and opposite change in the current-account
balance.  In the intermediate and more realistic case
of flexible exchange rates with intervention, the
amount of reserve accumulation is a policy choice.
The more aggressive is the reserve accumulation, the
more thoroughly will the authorities insulate the
nominal exchange rate from pressures generated by
the capital flows.
Intervention will have important effects on the short-
run adjustment to capital-account shocks, as can be
seen most clearly by contrasting the short-run
adjustment under fixed exchange rates with that
which would occur under a pure float.  In the former
regime, the capital inflows will lead to immediate
reserve  accumulation which, with incomplete
sterilization, will generate an increase in the domestic
monetary base.  This increase in liquidity will drive
down interest rates and generate an expansion of
bank credit generating, over time and in the context
of an output boom, the increase in domestic
consumption and investment that is required to make
the current account adjust to the new and higher
availability of external finance.  The opposite would,
of course, occur after a sharp decline in the rate of
capital inflow.
Under flexible exchange rates with no intervention, a
shock to the capital account generates, by definition,
no change in central bank reserves and creates,
instead, exchange-rate appreciation.  This
appreciation creates through various mechanisms a
current-account deficit, in the context of depressed
demand for domestic production.
In intermediate cases where exchange-market
intervention is not completely dictated by the
requirement to defend the exchange rate, nor ruled
out by definition, the short-run response of the
macroeconomy will depend upon the authorities'
intervention behavior, which will, in turn, depend in
part upon how their reserve position compares with
that which they consider optimal.  If reserves are lowPage 9
at the beginning of an inflows episode, central banks
may be expected to accumulate reserves in its initial
stages, even if not required to do so by a formal
exchange-rate commitment.  Over time, the tendency
to accumulate reserves may decline.
The optimal degree of reserve accumulation also
depends upon prospects for a reversal of the shock to
the capital account.  If there is a high probability that
the capital that is currently flowing into the economy
will want to leave in the near future, then it would be
prudent to seek a higher level of reserves.  Thus,
when capital inflows are the result of very short-term
and speculative investments, aggressive and
prolonged intervention may be called for.
The capital  inflows episode of the 1990s was
accompanied by very substantial reserve
accumulation, significantly larger than was observed
during the 1970s.  This was particularly true in the
first years of the episode.  In 1990 the accumulation
of international reserves nearly matched the (still
relatively small) net capital inflows, with the
implication that the latter had no effect on the current
account.
As the episode progressed, evidence of "reserve
accumulation fatigue" materialized.  For the region as
a whole, the share of reserve accumulation in total
capital inflows fell to 50 percent in 1991, 40 percent
in 1992, and about 30 percent in 1993, with the
implication that the capital inflows were associated
with growing current-account deficits.  In 1994 the
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Reserve Accumulation in Latin America
(Percent of net capital inflows)
This sharp decline in the rate of reserve accumulation
is largely attributable to developments in Mexico and
Venezuela, in which countries reserves were run
down in 1994 to cope with a macroeconomic and
financial crisis associated with large capital outflows.
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In other countries reserve accumulation averaged
about 75 percent of the capital inflows during the
1990-1992 period, declining to about 40 percent in
1993 and 1994.
Brazil accumulated  reserves  most aggressively
during the recent inflows episode; indeed, its reserve
accumulation totaled almost 120 percent of total
capital inflows during the period.  Reserve
accumulation also accounted for a large proportion of
capital inflows in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.
As noted above, reserve accumulation was quite low
for Mexico and Venezuela, though this is largely
attributable to events that transpired in 1994.   In
particular, in Mexico the central bank accumulated
reserves on a large scale during the first years of the
inflows episode, but lost those reserves and more
during 1994, when it responded to a sharp reduction
in the rate of capital inflow by intervening in the
foreign exchange market to maintain the peso within
the limits of the band, while at the same time
sterilizing the consequent reserve losses.Page 10
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During a period of capital inflows, as reserves are
accumulated, the central bank will be faced with the
question whether to sterilize the change in reserves,
or instead allow it to affect the domestic money
supply.  If the money supply is allowed to adjust,
(risk-adjusted) domestic interest rates will be driven
toward world rates, the economy will adjust to the
flows as described above, and the incentives for
further capital flows will be reduced.  Under
sterilization, the macroeconomic adjustment to the
capital inflows may be postponed, but because
domestic interest rates will not be driven to world
rates, the magnitude of the capital inflows may
increase.  The resultant quasi-fiscal losses, as the
central bank issues high-interest domestic paper in
exchange for low-interest reserve assets, can be
substantial.  Partly for this reason, attempts to
sterilize the impact of large capital inflows have often
been abandoned, or complemented in short order by
attempts directly to reduce the rate of short-term
capital inflow.
In Latin America during the 1990s, there is some
evidence that countries found it difficult or
undesirable to sterilize fully the reserve accumulation
that was undertaken.  As the following chart shows,
countries that accumulated significant reserves tended
also to experience rapid monetary growth.  The
relationship is, however, not particularly tight,
suggesting that there is some scope for sterilization






















































































Dominican Rep. Panama Paraguay














Suriname are excluded from
this graph.
Chile
stands out for having accumulated reserves in the
amount of nearly 4 percent of GDP per year, while
managing to maintain relatively moderate monetary
growth.
4.  Mechanisms of current-account adjustment
Under both fixed and flexible exchange rates, the
current account will generally adjust at some point to
a sustained capital inflow.  Two key mechanism are
responsible for bringing about the movement toward
current-account deficit in response to capital inflows.
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¦ The inflows will generally create a
reduction in domestic interest rates and an
increase in asset prices, thus promoting an increase
in expenditure relative to production.  Under fixed
exchange rates this is largely due to an expansion
of liquidity and an associated increase bank
lending.
¦ They will also create pressures  for real
exchange-rate appreciation.  Under flexible
exchange rates this is caused by nominal
exchange-rate appreciation.  Under fixed exchange
rates the real appreciation is created by domestic
inflation.  This may take longer to materialize than
under flexible exchange rates, but in the long run
the real exchange rate will respond in much the
same way.
These responses are immediately apparent in Latin
America during the 1990s.Page 11
Current account and the real exchange rate
As the following chart indicates, the current account
in Latin America moved dramatically toward deficit
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Current Account Deficit: Latin America
(Million 1994 dollars)
As noted above, the rate of reserve accumulation
during 1991-1994 was substantially larger than in the
1970s, with the result that, though the capital inflows
were larger in the more recent period, current-
account deficits in the region as a whole have been
somewhat smaller than they were in the previous
inflows episode.  They have nevertheless been large
in aggregate.
Here, however, the regional average obscures
important differences among countries.  The attached
set of charts shows fluctuations in capital flows and
current-accounts for the eight largest countries in
Latin America.  Most of these countries have
experienced somewhat smaller current-account
deficits than in the previous inflows episode.
It is notable that Brazil, Chile and Ecuador have
experienced surpluses or small deficits in recent
years, in very sharp contrast to the large deficits
registered in the 1977-1981 period, and while
Colombia and Peru have recently experienced
substantial current-account deficits, they remain
significantly lower than in the previous episode.
In Argentina and Mexico, however, external deficits
are very large, in absolute amount and compared with
those that the countries experienced in the years
leading up to the debt crisis.  For Mexico, the 1994
current account amounted to about 8 percent of GDP
- substantially larger than in the years leading up to
the debt crisis.
The large current account deficits were, in most
countries, accompanied by substantial appreciation of
the real exchange rate.  For the region as a whole the
real exchange rate appreciated substantially in
comparison with its very depreciated levels of the
mid-1980's, but remained considerably more
depreciated than in 1981 and 1982.  For the region as
a whole, there is a clear empirical association
between the availability of international capital and
the real exchange rate.  The real exchange rate was
very appreciated during the early 1980's, when
international capital was plentiful, depreciated
dramatically when the flows of international capital
slowed in the 1980's and has became increasingly
appreciated during the years of international capital
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 Real Exchange Rate - Latin America
Index uses GDP weights. An
increase in the index
represents a depreciation.
Again, the behavior of this regional average obscures
important differences among countries.  The real
exchange rate appreciated considerably during the
inflows episode in Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, and Uruguay.
10  Chile experienced a smaller
exchange-rate appreciation, and in Brazil the
exchange-rate depreciated until the mid-1994
stabilization plan, after which it began to appreciate
strongly.  Note that  substantial real exchange rate
appreciation was experienced by countries operating
under fixed as well as under flexible exchange rate
regimes.Page 12























It may be quite misleading to attribute the exchange-
rate appreciation solely or even primarily to the
capital flows; in many countries the timing of the
exchange-rate appreciation and associated changes in
the current-account match the timing of an inflation
stabilization more closely than that of the capital
inflows.  But whatever the causality, there is a clear
correlation between changes in the real exchange rate
and changes in the current-account balance, as
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 The Real Exchange Rate
 and the Current Account
The change in the current account
is scaled by the initial (1990)
level of exports.  The line is the
regression line indicated by the
data in the scatterplot.
While this association between the current account
and the real exchange rate does not establish
causality, it does suggest strongly that the dominant
shock to the current account was not a supply shock
to the current account.
Most countries in the region experienced
deteriorations in the current account during the 1990-
1994 period.  But the  deteriorations were
substantially larger in countries where the real
exchange rate appreciated substantially than in
countries where it did not.
Asset prices
Along with appreciation of the real exchange rate,
recipients of capital inflows in the 1990s experienced
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 Equity Markets in Latin America
(Constant U.S. dollars)
The above chart documents the behavior of the stock
market in four large Latin America economies,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
11  In real terms,
this measure of equity prices stagnated during the
1980s, when international capital was scarce, and
exploded during the inflows episode of the 1990s,
rising by a factor of six over the course of only four
years.  All major countries except Venezuela
12
experienced very large increases in equity prices
during the inflows episode.
The chart also shows that what capital markets give,
they can also take away; with the abrupt decline in
the rate of capital inflow at the end of 1994, equity
prices plummeted in Latin America.  Declines have
been widespread; most countries experienced
substantial declines in domestic equity prices after the
Mexican financial crisis.  Here, however, it is
noteworthy that Chile and Colombia have been
affected to a much smaller degree than have been
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico itself.
Table 1
























This suggests that some aspect of these former
countries' policy regime provided insulation from the
financial shock.  It is, unfortunately, difficult to say
precisely which policy was responsible, for Chile and
Colombia differ from Argentina in at least a couple of
ways:
P Their exchange rate policies are less rigidly tied
to the achievement of specific nominal outcomes,
and both countries have demonstrated a recent
willingness to allow the nominal exchange rate to
adjust in response to capital inflows;
P Both countries have made serious attempts to
reduce the inflow of short-term capital during the
inflows episode, and both countries sterilized
roughly 60 percent of the inflows that did emerge.
(Brazil sterilized aggressively during the 1991-
1994 period as well, but the Brazilian policy
regime changed dramatically with the mid-1994
stabilization.)
P Both countries recently experienced a significant
and favorable shock to the terms of trade.
These financial-market effects may create an
important asymmetry between capital inflows and
outflows.  Large inflows are associated with
increasing asset prices and ample domestic liquidity,
which may lead to inappropriate lending decisions,
but will not create a crisis.  Outflows, on the other
hand, are often associated with declining asset prices
and, under fixed exchange rates, may require a sharp
contraction of the domestic money supply and,
therefore, of commercial bank lending.  Both of these
can contribute to instability in the domestic banking
system.  In this environment, associated fears -
whether rational or exaggerated - about the safety of
the banking system can be highly destabilizing and, if
they create a full-blown banking crisis, may
undermine the government's fiscal and monetary
policies.
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Public vs. private adjustment
It is of major importance that the current-account
deficits that emerged in Latin America in the 1990s
occurred despite a substantial improvement in fiscal
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Regional average Excluding Brazil
Fiscal Deficit in Latin America
(Central overnment, GDP-weighted avg)
Data are unavailable for Brazil in
1993 and 1994.  It was assumed
that the Brazilian deficit in those
years equals the 1992 deficit.  This
probably understates the
improvement in the regional fiscal
balance in 1993 and 1994.
As the above chart illustrates, central governments in
the region registered an average fiscal deficit of more
than 10 percent of GDP in 1988 and 1989.  This was
cut in half during 1990, and in 1991-1993 the deficit
averaged less than 1 percent of GDP.
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There was also significant fiscal convergence during
this period; the countries that made the most dramatic
improvements in fiscal performance in the 1990s
were the ones that began with the largest fiscal
imbalances.  This means that very few countries in
Latin America had substantial deficits in the 1990s,
and that the current-account imbalances that emerged
were predominantly the result of a growing gap
between private savings and investment.  We shall
return to this point below.
Saving and investment
A key question for policymakers is how the current
account response to a change in capital flows is
effected; through changes in saving or in domestic
investment.  To the extent that domestic savings and
investment fall short, for various reasons, of the
socially optimal level, policymakers may be
concerned to ensure that savings does not fall too
dramatically during periods of capital inflow, and that
investment does not fall excessively when
international capital becomes scarce.Page 14
In practice, capital inflows to Latin America have
been associated with both increased investment and
decreased savings, and conversely, while the
reduction in inflows during the 1983-1990 period was
associated mainly with a decline in private and public
investment.  After the very sharp decline in capital
flows to Latin America that began in 1982, the
current-account adjustment was achieved in very
large part through a decline in both public and private
investment, and investment remained extremely low
by historical standards until well into the most recent
inflows episode.
As the capital inflows of the 1990s began to make
themselves felt in Latin American economies,
domestic investment did recover from its extremely










1960  1963  1966  1969  1972  1975  1978  1981  1984  1987  1990  1993 
Regional average Brazil Other countries
Ratio of Investment to GDP
As the above chart illustrates, in the region as a
whole (real) investment rose from less than 20
percent of GDP in 1989-1990 to over 22 percent of
GDP in 1994.  Setting Brazil aside, investment rose
more dramatically, from roughly 18.5 percent in
1989-1990 to nearly 25 percent of GDP in 1994.
While an increase in domestic investment was thus an
important cause of the current-account deficits that
materialized during the most recent capital  inflows
episode, savings also declined in most countries.  The
declines in national savings began at different times in
different countries, and have been very pronounced in
several countries.
The causes of these often very sharp declines in
private savings are not fully understood.  The decline
in saving may have been due to wealth effects of the
booming equity, land, and housing markets associated
with the capital inflows.  They may have been due to
the relaxation of financing constraints attributable to
the expansion of domestic bank credit caused
associated with the monetary consequences of the
inflows.  Or they may have been due to an excessively
optimistic view by domestic consumers of prospects
for the future.  But whatever their cause, the
consequence was a substantial movement of the
current account into deficit, thus utilizing the
increased supply of international financing.
When current account deficits are associated with
large fiscal deficits, there is little dispute about the
desirability of reducing such deficits by bringing the
government's budget toward balance.  However
when, as in the 1990s, the large current account
deficits are associated with an imbalance of private
saving and investment, the effectiveness and
desirability of using fiscal or other policies to raise
national saving are a matter of some dispute.
First, whether current account deficits generated by
movements in private saving and investment pose a
policy problem is itself a matter of substantial dispute.
On the one hand, it can be argued that individuals
know better than do governments how best to
arrange their intertemporal affairs.  On the other hand
it is argued that the costs of the macroeconomic and
financial turbulence that ensue when external deficits
- private or public - become  unfinanceable are
frequently socialized, creating a public interest in
ensuring that the private as well as the public sector
remain safely within their  intertemporal budget
constraints.
Second, instruments for affecting private savings and
domestic investment are notoriously scarce,
unreliable, and costly to use.  Prudential regulation of
the banking system, to discourage inappropriately
risky lending by banks that benefit from implicit or
explicit deposit insurance may be called for, as are
measures to prevent the increased domestic liquidity
generated by rapid capital inflows from translating
into excessively rapid growth in bank credit.Page 15
But the major instrument for affecting national
savings is fiscal policy.  Unfortunately, there is good
theoretical and some empirical support for the idea
that private savings may adjust to partly offset
changes in taxes, particularly if these are perceived to
be transitory.  This means that large changes in tax
policy may be required to offset swings in capital
flows, which is not only politically and
administratively difficult, but also inefficient on
public-finance grounds.  Similar considerations apply
to government spending.  National budgets are more
than just levers of macroeconomic policy; they are
the chief means through which important social
policies that determine the health, education, and
national defense of the domestic population are
realized.  Subjecting these programs to radical
fluctuations in response to movements in international
capital flows be necessary, but it is not costless.
III. Policy issues
With this brief overview of the basic macroeconomics
of international capital flows as a backdrop, we
proceed to a discussion of policy issues raised by
recent Latin American experience.  This section
focuses on a selected set of broad issues and policy
strategies rather than a comprehensive and detailed
analysis of operational issues surrounding the policies
toward international capital flows.  An appendix to
the paper provides a more detailed discussion of
issues surrounding specific policy instruments.
Prospects and immediate policy response
The sharp reduction in capital flows to the region that
occured in the immediate aftermath of the Mexican
crisis has eased.  To several countries in the region,
and many other emerging market economies outside
it, capital inflows are once again large enough to pose
the policy challenges that materialized in the 1990-
1994 period.  One, though not the only, reason for
the renewed flows to the region is the substantial
decline in US interest rates that took place in the
early months of 1995; the development thus
highlights once again the region's exposure to
fluctuations in world interest rates.
Despite the generalized recovery of capital flows to
much of the region, flows to Argentina, Mexico, and
Venezuela have remained sharply lower.  Even there,
though, there are some signs of recovery.  For
example, the government of Argentina has
successfully re-entered international financial
markets, as have some Mexican borrowers, including
Bancomex, Nafinsa, and the Government of Mexico
and also a few from the Mexican private sector.
However, in almost all cases interest-rate spreads
have been fairly high, and loan durations short.
What are the lessons of this recent experience?
v  First, the policy problem that faces countries in the
region is not primarily one of managing a long- or
medium-term scarcity of capital flows, but rather
coping with their highly volatile nature.  Large cross-
border capital flows are likely to remain an important
feature of the international financial landscape for the
foreseeable future, but those flows are likely to
remain highly volatile.
v  Second, the "Tequila effect" of the Mexican crisis
on several countries in the region during the early
part of 1995 illustrates that "contagion effects" are
real; a country may experience shocks to the capital
account as a result of developments in other
borrowing countries, despite the fundamental
soundness of its own policy framework.  This creates
vulnerabilities that require careful management.  But
the recent experience also shows that markets
eventually make distinctions that reflect underlying
fundamentals, and if a country can weather temporary
financial storms with its macroeconomic policies and
other fundamentals intact, international investors
eventually respond accordingly.
The danger posed by volatile capital flows is that, in a
fragile macroeconomic environment, even transitory
capital-account shocks may create lasting disruptions.
These disruptions could even be large enough to
validate the initially exaggerated fears about a
country's creditworthiness.  The challenge, therefore,
is to construct policy regimes that create a robust and
"shock proof" economy capable of withstanding
temporary shocks to international capital flows, while
at the same time maximizing the developmental
impact of international investment.  We now considerPage 16
five aspects of this challenge: exchange rate policy,
debt management, fiscal policy, regulation of capital
inflows, and the role of the international financial
institutions.
Policy regimes for a world of volatile capital flows
  1. Exchange-rate policy
On this issue, no strong consensus has emerged from
the recent experience.  Advocates of fixed exchange
rates note that the Mexican devaluation was followed
by a major crisis, while supporters of exchange rate
flexibility point toward the deep and growing
macroeconomic costs of the monetary contraction
generated by the "classical" balance of payments
adjustment that has been enforced by the Argentine
convertibility plan.  Clearly, neither fixed nor flexible
exchange rates can eliminate the macroeconomic pain
created by a sudden loss of international confidence.
Can intelligent choice of exchange-rate regime
prevent such a loss of confidence?  More generally,
what are the lessons of recent Latin American
experience for exchange rate managment in a world
of volatile capital flows?
First, recent experience highlights the importance of
sustainability of the exchange-rate regime adopted by
a country.  While there is room for dispute about the
insulating properties of alternative exchange-rate
regimes, there is little doubt about the destabilizing
consequences of being forced to abandon a regime
that proved insufficiently robust to survive a large
shock, from the capital account or elsewhere.
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Thus, a case for the desirability of fixed exchange
rates must rest first upon a reasonable expectation
that the regime will be robust enough to withstand
the major shocks to which it will eventually be
subjected.
In this context two issues arise.  The first is the need
for a forceful fiscal response to protect a fixed
exchange rate system after a sudden reduction in
capital flows.  Here, the recent experience of
Argentina is revealing.  The Argentine exchange-rate
system did not weather the 1995 shock automatically
and painlessly.  Protecting the system from collapse
required a determined fiscal response - tax increases
and spending cuts both - that were not only
procyclical but also politically very costly.  These
actions were politically viable in Argentina because of
the strong popular commitment to the convertibility
law, grounded in the perception that the system is
necessary in Argentina to avoid the inflationary
experiences of the past.  In countries where public
support for the exchange-rate system is less strong,
the fiscal response to capital-account shocks may not
be forthcoming, and the system is unlikely to survive
a major shock.
The sustainability of fixed exchange rates also
depends upon the strength of the domestic financial
system.  As the Argentine example indicates, the
adjustment to a reduction of capital flows under fixed
exchange rates involves a potentially sharp monetary
contraction, which means both high interest rates and
a cutback in credit extended to domestic borrowers.
Under these circumstances, borrowers may
experience difficulties in servicing their debts, and
unless the banking system is robust, a highly
disruptive banking crisis may emerge.
These considerations highlight the value of exchange-
rate flexibility in the aftermath of a shock to capital
flows.   In addition to the issues described above,
there is the simple fact that capital-account shocks
require an adjustment of the real exchange rate, and it
is macroeconomically less disruptive to achieve this
through an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate
than through changes in the myriad prices of the
goods and services produced in a modern economy.
The main reason to forego the benefits of more
flexible exchange rates is the desire to find a means of
enforcing commitment by monetary policymakers to a
stable and  noninflationary policy, by reducing the
scope for discretion in setting monetary policy.  In
some countries, the value of the commitment that is
provided by fixed exchange rates may outweigh the
loss of flexibility.  But in other cases rigid exchange-
rate commitments may be a very expensive way to
impose discipline on monetary authorities.  In such
cases, is all lost in the struggle for discipline and
commitment?
The answer is no.  Advocates of rigid exchange-rate
regimes or unbreakable monetary rules as the onlyPage 17
mechanisms available to solve the problem of time
inconsistency in monetary policy may be unduly
pessimistic.  What matters is not that there be a
single, unbreakable rule, but rather that policymakers
adopt and communicate to the public a set of
principles for policy formation that preclude
"opportunistic" actions.  These principles could be
reinforced by public commitments to, for example,
specific inflation targets.
16  But such principles need
not preclude a policy response to changed
circumstances, as long as the response is understood
by the public to be part of a sensible and predictable
regime.
Here, the experiences of Chile and Colombia are
instructive.   Neither country operates under freely
floating exchange rates, and both countries have
oriented monetary policy toward satisfying some
form of exchange-rate commitment.  On the other
hand, both countries have also retained substantial
discretion in the  management of their monetary and
exchange-rate policies.  So, for example, when in
1994 and 1995 large capital inflows posed a difficult
choice between maintaining their announced
exchange-rate bands and suffering inflationary
pressures, or changing the band to allow the
exchange rate to appreciate, both countries chose to
move the exchange-rate bands.  This adjustment of
policy was not perceived as a violation  of  policy
commitments or a fundamental change in the "rules of
the game", but rather as a policy response to an
external shock wholly consistent with the underlying
"policy regime".  In contrast, the Mexican
devaluation of December 1994 was viewed by many
participants in international financial markets as a
negation of  previously-made policy commitments,
because in their view the authorities had made
unconditional promises to maintain the previously
existing exchange-rate regime.
Thus, the conflict between "commitment" and
"flexibility" in the choice of exchange rate regime can
be alleviated by rules that are contingent, in
reasonably predictable and well understood ways,
upon unforeseen macroeconomic developments.
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For such a regime to be credible it must first be
comprehensible, which means that the "rules of the
game" need to be reasonably simple.  But, as the
examples of Chile and Colombia illustrate, they need
not be so simplistic as to preclude an exchange-rate
response to a genuine and observable shock to the
economy.
  1. Debt managment
Debt maturity:  The crisis that followed the Mexican
devaluation was badly aggravated by the country's
reliance upon short-term debt, which made the
country highly dependent upon continual access to
international credit markets to roll over much of the
outstanding stock of debt.  Even a temporary loss of
market access placed the country in an untenable
position, from which it was extracted only by deep
and painful adjustment measures and extraordinary
efforts of the international community.   Argentina
was better able to defend its exchange-rate regime
during the financial-market turbulence of early 1995,
because its longer-term debt profile relieved it of the
need to access international financial markets during
the worst of the international financial turbulence,
and permitted the country to delay its return to those
markets until after the panic had subsided and a
strong adjustment package had helped reestablish its
perceived creditworthiness.  Put differently, the fact
that investors did not have the opportunity to leave in
herds in a short period of uncertainty gave crucial
time for authorities to react, adjusting fundamentals
as required, and restoring confidence.
Thus debt, and particularly short-term debt, can
aggravate economic instability. Governments should
therefore finance themselves with medium- and long-
term debt the the maximum possible extent.  And, to
guard against potential negative effects of debt, it is
important that the Central Bank hold a significant
proportion of the country's expected debt service
(including amortization) of the following quarters in
highly liquid and readily available international
reserves. This policy implies that if the debt is short
run, it would have to have almost full backing in
international reserves, over and above the coverage
that is required to assure prompt payment of imports
and fluctuations in the demand for base money.
Denomination:  If the stock of domestic debt is large
and is denominated in domestic currency, it may bePage 18
difficult to extend its maturity, given the inherent
exchange risks involved and the volatility in inflation
and interest rates. Also, it may be subject to self-
fulfilling expectations of inflation. If investors believe
that inflation will accelerate, they will demand a
higher interest  rate which will aggravate the fiscal
deficit and may force the government to
accommodate the expected higher inflation. One
means of reducing these problems is to denominate
government debt contracts in a more stable unit of
account, or to provide a mechanism to adjust returns,
protecting them from the ravages of inflation.  When
debt is denominated in foreign currency we speak of
"dollarization", when it is indexed to some measure
of domestic prices we speak of "indexation".
Choosing either of these two mechanisms would
insulate interest rates from changes in the public's
expectations of inflation or of exchange rate
movements. Moreover, by protecting investors from
changes in inflation, exchange rates and domestic
interest rates these denominations may allow the
government to extend the maturity of the debt.
However, if the government policy is unsustainable
and will require, eventually, a major adjustment of the
exchange rate or an acceleration of inflation, the
stock of  dollarized or indexed debt will be made
effectively more expensive, precisely at the time when
debt service is harder to maintain.  Hence,
denominating the debt in dollars or in an indexed unit
should never be made as a means to postpone a
needed adjustment.  But if it is done in the context of
a sustainable program, it may help to shelter that
program against self-fulfilling expectations and to
extend debt maturities.
Place of issue:  Should public debt be issued
domestically or abroad? This distinction is becoming
less relevant with the liberalization of capital
transactions, which implies that foreigners can buy
debt issued domestically and residents can buy bonds
issued abroad. Nevertheless, there are two important
elements which should be taken into account. First, it
is important to determine whether the  debt is
purchased by the domestic banking system,
something that is more likely to happen with
domestically issued debt. This is so because banks
purchase these instruments with resources obtained
through very  short term deposits. Moreover, they
typically have a guaranteed access liquidity from the
Central Bank in case of need. Usually,  short term
domestic debt can be used for repurchase operations
with the Central Bank. Hence, in practice, domestic
debt held by banks is equivalent to interest-bearing
money. It is, therefore, more inflationary than debt
held by foreigners but it is somewhat less sensitive to
changes in international interest rates because it is
demanded in part for liquidity purposes.
By contrast, demand for foreign debt may be more
volatile since it usually represents very small
percentages of the holder's portfolio and these
fractions may be very unstable. If it is short term, this
could pose very serious problems. Consequently,
short term foreign debt may not be as inflationary but
may be a dangerous source of volatility.
  1. Fiscal policy
Fluctuations in capital flows will, like other
macroeconomic shocks, generally demand a fiscal
response.  The need for a swift response is
particularly acute in the immediate aftermath of an
adverse shock because such a shock often implies a
sharp contraction in the availability of non-
inflationary financing of fiscal deficits, while at same
time its contractionary impact tends to increase fiscal
deficits. But more generally, because capital-account
(and other) shocks are so much larger in Latin
America than in industrial economies, the pace of
fiscal adjustment needs to be more rapid;
unfortunately, Latin America and the Caribbean
cannot afford the protracted discussions and
adjustments that may be tolerable in the industrial
economies.
However, the political process through which fiscal
policy is decided is similar in the region to that of
most democracies. It typically involves an Executive
Branch and a Legislative Branch. The Executive has
several spending ministries and the legislative may
have two houses. Each law requires two discussions
in each house and a reconciliation between the two to
sort out the differences. Going through the process
takes time and this is not only because of bureaucratic
delay.  As argued by  Alesina and  Drazen (1992),Page 19
different constituencies may have incentives to delay
adjustment, not because they believe adjustment is
not needed but because, by obstructing a solution,
they may be able to shift the burden of adjustment
onto other groups.
Given the larger fiscal risks, the limited willingness of
financial markets to finance the implied deficits with a
prudent debt structure, and the inherent difficulty
faced by democratic political systems to react quickly
to budget problems, it is not surprising that fiscal
policy has been such an important determinant of
macroeconomic instability in Latin America.
However, there are concrete policy strategies that can
ameliorate the problem. Some strategies of particular
relevance for the management of volatile international
capital flows are:
18 (i) set precautionary fiscal targets,
(ii) adopt budgetary rules and institutions that deliver
quick responses, (iii) institutionalize contingent rules
for shock management.
Set precautionary fiscal targets:  In principle, it
would be desirable to offset the contractionary impact
of a sudden reduction in capital flows with a counter-
cyclical fiscal expansion.  The difficulty, of course, is
that the shock also makes non-inflationary financing
for the implied budget deficits much more scarce,
potentially creating the need for a pro-cyclical fiscal
contraction instead.  This is particularly likely if the
fiscal situation is precarious before the shock arrrives.
This creates the apparently paradoxical possibility
that fiscal contraction is the appropriate response to
sudden capital inflows and outflows, in the former
case to limit the expansionary impact of the inflows,
and in the latter case to bring the government's
financing requirements into line with the new, lower
availability of noninflationary financing.
If, however, countries adopt the practice of targeting
a fiscal surplus during normal times, a counter-
cyclical response to adverse capital-account shocks
becomes much easier to achieve.  It is, after all, much
easier to permit a budget surplus to become smaller
than it is to finance a budget that has moved into
deficit in the aftermath of an adverse shock to the
capital account.  And, in the long run, the lower
steady-state capital stock will reduce the likelihood
that domestic and international investors will develop
fears about the government's creditworthiness.
Adopt budgetary rules and institutions that deliver
quick responses:  The fiscal response to an economic
shock is the outcome of decisionmakers working with
a specific institutional context. This institutional
context defines the terms of the budgetary debate, for
example by establishing the relationship between the
Ministry of Finance and the spending ministries and
between the executive and the legislature, and thus
helps determine budgetary outcomes.   Alesina,
Hausmann,  Hommes and Stein (1995) provide
evidence, for example, that the budgetary rules that
exist in different Latin American economies have had
important effects on long-run fiscal outcomes.
Similarly, some institutional features of budgetary
management are conducive to rapid and effective
fiscal response to shocks, while others increase the
risk of gridlock and delay.  For example, it is
commonly the case that the executive proposes a
budget which must be acted upon, after debate, by
the legislature.  If there is no deadline, incentives for
the legislature to come to a timely agreement may be
insufficient to prevent deadlock.  On the other hand,
if there is a deadline after which, for example, the
executive's proposed budget  comes into force, the
legislature is provided with much stronger incentives
to enact budgetary legislation promptly.
Institutionalize contingent rules for shock
management:  Explicit rules that specify the fiscal
response to major economic contingencies can also
promote effective fiscal adjustment.  Stabilization
funds, such as for copper in Chile and for oil and
coffee in Colombia, are one form of automatic
spending rule that is particularly well suited for
clearly identified sources of revenue volatility.  But
such automatic adjustments can also apply to
revenues as well.  For example, in Ecuador the
contingent rule specifies that if oil tax revenue falls
below the budgeted level, the domestic price of
gasoline must be increased in order to make up for
the fiscal shortfall.  Sharp fluctuations in capital flows
will, through their effect on international trade,
domestic spending and other determinants of the tax
base, exert and indirect but potentially powerfulPage 20
effect on fiscal outcomes.  It would be useful to reach
agreement, before such shocks arrive, on a set of
rules that determine how to absorb the fiscal
implications.
  1. Regulation of capital inflows
Integration into world financial markets holds
enormous promise for the economic development of
Latin America.  But the policy problems created by
volatile capital flows are serious as well, which raises
the question whether some regulation of such flows is
called for, and if so, how it should be structured.
There is no consensus on this issue, but it seems safe
to say that the turmoil that  afllicted international
financial markets in early 1995 has increased the
respectability of proposals to regulate international
capital flows, not as a panacea for the problem, but as
one of several policy instruments that may be enlisted
to reduce the volatility of capital flows and ameliorate
their macroeconomic consequences.
A first question is whether such regulation can be
effective at all  all.  Experience shows that the
effectiveness of restrictions on financial flows tends
gradually to diminish over time, as market
participants find ways around the restrictions, except
perhaps in very highly regulated financial systems.  If
regulation of capital flows becomes totally ineffective
it will be, at best, a useless instrument, and it may be
worse than useless if the actions taken to circumvent
the restrictions are themselves economically costly.
The potential effectiveness of restrictions on capital
flows is an empirical issue that needs to be settled on
a country-by-country basis.  It should be noted,
however, that permanent and total isolation from
fluctuations in international capital flows is not a
plausible or sensible  goal, and the enforcement
difficulties of the regulation required to achieve this
draconian end are not relevant.  What is at issue is the
scope for altering, at the margin and perhaps
temporarily, the magnitude and types of flows
experienced by a country.  The experiences of
Colombia and Chile are revealing here.  Both
countries have made substantial efforts to regulate
capital inflows, particularly of short-term debt.  Both
have nevertheless faced significant policy challenges
from high rates of capital inflow, suggesting that the
restrictions were not a panacea.  But both countries
were also essentially unaffected by the "Tequila
effect" that gripped much of the continent in the
aftermath of the Mexican devaluation.  This suggests
that regulation of capital inflows need not be
perfectly effective to provide meaningful protection
against international financial turmoil.
A second question is whether inflows and outflows
should be treated symmetrically.  On the one hand, it
might be argued that the policy problem stems not
from inflows themselves, but rather from the
possibility of sudden outflows, so that attempting to
regulate the outflows would be a more direct
approach to the problem.  However, regulation of
capital outflows may be much less effective than that
of inflows.  To paraphrase an old saying about the
stock market,  inflows are generated by investors'
hopes and outflows by their fears, and the reality is
that fear is a more potent motivator than is hope.
More to the point, there is a danger that restrictions
on capital inflows will be used, as they have in the
past, to insulate misguided economic policies from
market discipline.  Even if this is not the purpose or
the result of the policy, it may lead to difficulties by
creating an unfortunate perception.  These problems
apply less forcefully to regulation of capital inflows.
Here, the problem is typically the need to find another
macroeconomic instrument for coping with the
macroeconomic boom that results from inflows that
derive from international confidence in economic
prospects and the policy regime, and to ensure that
the inflows do not make the economy excessively
vulnerable to sudden withdrawals of capital.  They
are therefore unlikely to be, or be perceived as,
substitutes for policy discipline.  And because capital
inflows are motivated by favorable interest-rate
differentials that are substantially smaller than the
losses that investors may fear when attempting to
withdraw their capital, regulation of inflows is more
likely to be effective.
A third question is whether different forms of capital
inflow should be treated differently.  On the one
hand, the short-term macroeconomic impact of
capital inflows is largely independent of the financial
instrument in which they are effected.  However,Page 21
different kinds of capital inflow expose the economy
differently to the risk of sudden, subsequent
withdrawals of capital.  In particular, the danger
posed by the "rollover risk" that was highlighted in
our discussion of public debt management applies
equally to privately-issued international debt.  There
may therefore be a special policy interest in ensuring
that short-term international debt is issued prudently
by private, as well as public borrowers.
  1. The role of international monetary coordination
The greatly increased international mobility of capital
has increased the magnitude of the financial problems
with which policymakers must cope both directly, by
increasing the magnitude of the financial shocks that
affect a given economy, and also by virtue of
"contagion" effects through which financial crisis in
one country may be transmitted to other vulnerable
economies.  But the amounts that can be raised
through normal channels are woefully inadequate to
ensure orderly adjustment to the massive balance of
payments shocks that occur in today's integrated
financial markets.
The international rescue package created to cope
with the financial disorder that followed the Mexican
devaluation highlights the inadequacy of current
arrangements for international monetary cooperation
in a world of highly mobile capital.  The rescue effort
took many weeks to mount, required highly
unorthodox methods on the part of both the
International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury,
and remains sufficiently controversial as to create
strong doubts about that it could be replicated for any
other country.  This raises the question whether and
how  existing mechanisms of international monetary
cooperation need to be reformed.
If the international community is to cope with these
larger international financial shocks, it will in all
likelihood need access to larger financial resources.
The main drawback of making such resources
available for rescue operations is the problem of
moral hazard created by investors' and policymakers'
perception that they will be, at least in part, bailed out
in the event of a crisis.  This may create incentives for
domestic policymakers and investors to behave in an
excessively risky manner.  One response to this
possibility is the creation of "early warning" systems,
which would improve international policymakers'
capacity for predicting, and heading off future crises.
The implied package of financial support to resolve
crisis with surveillance to head them off is, of course,
nothing new, but rather an expansion and
intensification of the International Monetary Fund's
main lines of business.
While the business of monitoring macroeconomic
developments and responding effectively to crises as
they arise is clearly important, more can be done to
reduce countries' vulnerability to  capital-account
shocks and increase their capacity to deal with them.
As we have tried to convey in this paper, both an
economy's vulnerability and its capacity to respond
effectively depend upon key structural characteristics.
These include, among other factors: the depth and
robustness of the domestic financial system, the
suitability of labor-market regulations, the nature of
budgetary institutions, and the capacity of the
domestic political system to forge a lasting consensus
on economic policy.  A focus on short-term
macroeconomic management cannot  subsitute for
systemic reforms in these areas.  While, as with short-
term macroeconomic policy formation, such reforms
are in the final analysis the responsibility of a
country's own policymakers and populations,
international agencies can assist by providing financial
assistance and, no less important, contributing the
expertise acquired through related policy research
and first-hand experience with similar reforms in
other countries.References
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1 
1The chart visually understates the rapidity of the drop in international capital flows in this period, which remained large through August
1982 and dropped very quickly to negligible levels after Mexico announced its inability to service its international debt according to schedule.
2 
2Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) find that foreign factors accounted for 30 to 60 percent of the variance in real exchange rates and
reserves.  Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (1993) and Fernandez-Arias (1993) also find that external factors explain a large proportion of
capital flows to Latin America.  In the discussion that follows we focus primarily upon external shocks to capital flows.
3 
3Business-cycle fluctuations associated with fluctuations in capital flows may involve such externalities: and Blanchard (1987) Cooper and
John (1988).  The sectoral reallocations induced by the real exchange-rate fluctuations that often accompany changes in the rate of capital flow
may also be subject to such externalities.  Mussa (1982) lays out of number of imperfections in the adjustment process.  In Gavin (1993) the
unemployment associated with sectoral adjustment of the economy is suboptimally high, providing a rationale for policy to "lean against the
wind" in response to shocks
4 
4Calvo and Reinhart (1994) provide empirical evidence on such "contagion" effects in Latin America.
5 
5Some care needs to be taken in the interpretation of these comparisons, as the required computation of U.S. dollar GDP is highly sensitive to
the exchange rate, and when the exchange rate is overvalued the ratios will tend to understate the magnitude of the flows compared with the
long-run sustainable levels of ($) GDP.
6 
6This point would hold as well for long-term debt, where there is significant price risk.
7 
7Of course, countries should expect international investors to demand compensation, in the form of higher required returns, for the risks
entailed by such commitments.
8 
8In Mexico alone, reserves declined by nearly $20 billion during 1994.
9 
9The following discussion is couched in terms of capital inflows for the sake of brevity.  The case of outflows is largely symmetric, with
potential asymmetries discussed in the text.
10 
10The 1990 starting point is fairly arbitrary, and is chosen because it represents the beginning of the inflows episode for most countries.
Because the Argentine exchange rate was in 1990 still influenced by the hyperinflation, the chart probably overestimates the amount of any
real overvaluation of the Argentine peso.
11 
11The index is a geometric average of real, dollar equity prices, weighted by market capitalization in 1994.  The U.S. producer price index is
used to deflate the indexes.
12 
12At the end of 1994, Venezuela was well into a major economic and financial crisis associated with adverse shocks to oil income and the
failure of a substantial portion of its banking system.
13 
13Losses associated with declines in the price of internationally-traded Argentine bonds were largely responsible for the 1995 collapse of a
merchant bank in Argentina.  Though the bank itself was relatively small, the collapse created confidence problems for a number of Argetine
banks.  More recently, the sharp contraction in the domestic financial system that has been imposed by the Argentine convertability plan with
capital outflows has generated interest rates so high as to call into question the ability of both the public and the private sectors to service their
debt.
14 
14These fiscal data are not adjusted for inflation, which was declining rapidly during this period, or for the business cycle.  Adjustment for
these factors would reduce the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment, but it would nonetheless remain substantial.
15 
15Hausmann,  Gavin   et.  al.  (1995) provide evidence on both the insulating properties of alternative exchange rate regimes and the
destabilizing consequences of unsustainability.  Their estimates imply that Latin America has in the past paid a high price for switching
between exchange-rate regimes, which has often occurred because the existing regime proved to be unsustainable.
16 
16See Leiderman and Svensson (1996) for a discussion of inflation targets as a device for providing "discipline" over monetary policy.
17 
17See Calvo (1992) for a more extended discussion of such "contingent rules".                                                                                                                                                                                                        
18 
18The following discussion draws heavily upon Hausmann, Gavin, et. al. (1995), which contains a much more extended discussion of these
and related strategies for assuring appropriate fiscal adjustment to shocks.                                                                                                                                                                                                        